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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0000047 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department 
Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department 
Date 
1/14/2010 
1/15/2010 
1/28/2010 
2/1/2010 
2/2/2010 
2/16/2010 
3/1/2010 
3/31/2010 
5/4/2010 
5/2/2010 
3/22/2010 
3/25/2010 
~/8/2010 
Code User Judge 
NCOC HENDRICKSO New Case Filed - Other Claims Steve Verby 
APER HENDRICKSO Plaintiff: Peck, Raymond Scott Appearance John Steve Verby 
PETN 
ORDR 
NOTC 
NOAP 
APER 
MISC 
NOTC 
NOFG 
MISC 
NOFG 
MISC 
NOTC 
BREF 
BREF 
BREF 
HRSC 
CMIN 
CTLG 
A Finney 
HENDRICKSO Filing: L3 -Appeal or petition for judicial review or Steve Verby 
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission, 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
MORELAND 
OPPELT 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
CMOORE 
CMOORE 
RASOR 
PHILLIPS 
board, or body to district court Paid by: Finney, 
John A (attorney for Peck, Raymond Scott) 
Receipt number: 0429543 Dated: 1/14/2010 
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Peck, Raymond 
Scott (plaintiff) 
Petition for Judicial Review and Ex Parte 
Application for Stay of Agency Decision 
Steve Verby 
Order Staying Suspension of Driving Privileges Steve Verby 
Notice of Lodging of Agency Record - from Idaho Steve Verby 
Transportation Dept. (no actual record filed at 
Clerk's Office - just the notice) 
Notice Of Appearance 
Defendant: Idaho Transportation Department 
Appearance Susan K. Servick 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Demand for Record and Transcript Steve Verby 
Notice of Estimate of Transcript Cost ($100 Steve Verby 
estimate by Hedrick Court Reporting in Boise) 
Notice Of Filing Agency Record Steve Verby 
Agency Record Steve Verby 
Notice Of Filing Supplemental Agency Record Steve Verby 
Transcript Dec 29, 2009, ITD hearing Steve Verby 
Notice of Briefing Schedule on Appeal Steve Verby 
Petitioner's Opening Brief Steve Verby 
Respondent's Brief Steve Verby 
Petitioner's Closing Brief Steve Verby 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Steve Verby 
09/08/2010 11 :00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing Steve Verby 
Court Minutes Steve Verby 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 9/8/201 O 
Time: 1 :37 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Val Larson 
Minutes Clerk: Sandra Rasor 
Tape Number: 2 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Steve Verby 
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: Court Log- Crtrm 2 
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Date: 
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Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department 
Date Code User 
9/8/2010 DCHH PHILLIPS Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held 
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Val Larson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
ADVS PHILLIPS Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held 
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
9/28/2010 DEOP PHILLIPS Decision on Appeal 
CDIS PHILLIPS Civil Dispositior:, entered for: Idaho Transportation 
Department, Defendant; Peck, Raymond Scott, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/28/2010 
STAT PHILLIPS STATUS CHANGED: closed 
10/12/2010 PETN OPPELT Petition for Rehearing and/or Motion to 
Reconsider and/or, Motion to Alter or Amend and 
Notice of Hearing 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/08/2010 10:30 AM) Petition for Rehearing 
and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion to 
Alter or Amend 
STAT OPPELT STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk 
action 
10/25/2010 MISC OPPELT Copy of Order Staying Suspension of Driving 
Privileges Requested by Susan Servick 
NOFH OPPELT Amended Notice Of Hearing 
CONT OPPELT Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
12/08/201010:30AM: Continued Petition for 
Rehearing and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Motion to Alter or Amend 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/22/2010 10:00 AM) Petition for Rehearing 
and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion to 
Alter or Amend 
10/26/2010 MISC OPPELT Copy of Order Staying Suspension of Driving 
Privileges Faxed to Susan Servick 
12/14/2010 REPL MORELAND Reply to Motion to Reconsider 
12/22/2010 DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
12/22/2010 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: Val Larson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Petition for Rehearing and/or Motion 
to Reconsider and/or Motion to Alter or Amend -
Less Than 100 Pages - Taken Under Advisement 
(Sue Servick by telephone) 
002 
User: KELSO 
Judge 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Date: 
Time: 
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Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department 
Date Code User Judge 
12/22/2010 CMIN ANDERSON Court Minutes Steve Verby 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 12/22/2010 
Time: 10:03 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Val Larson 
Minutes Clerk: Lynne Anderson 
Tape Number: CTRM 1 
John Finney 
Susan Servick 
ADVS PHILLIPS Case Taken Under Advisement Steve Verby 
12/28/2010 ORDR CMOORE Order on Petition for Rehearing Steve Verby 
CDIS PHILLIPS Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Transportation Steve Verby 
Department, Defendant; Peck, Raymond Scott, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/28/2010 
STAT PHILLIPS STATUS CHANGED: closed Steve Verby 
2/7/2011 PHILLIPS Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Steve Verby 
Supreme Court Paid by: Finney, John A 
(attorney for Peck, Raymond Scott) Receipt 
number: 0451311 Dated: 2/7/2011 Amount: 
$101.00 (Check) For: Peck, Raymond Scott 
(plaintiff) 
BONT PHILLIPS Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 451315 Steve Verby 
Dated 2/7/2011 for 200.00) 
BNDC PHILLIPS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 451316 Dated Steve Verby 
2/7/2011 for 100.00) 
NOTA KELSO Notice of Appeal-Finney def. atty Idaho Supreme Court 
CHJG OPPELT Change Assigned Judge Idaho Supreme Court 
2/10/2011 STIP PHILLIPS Stipulation to Stay Suspension of Driving Steve Verby 
Privileges 
2/11/2011 ORDR PHILLIPS Order Staying Suspension of Driving Privileges Steve Verby 
Upon Further Appeal 
2/25/2011 SCDF KELSO Supreme Court Document Filed- Misc-"NOTA Idaho Supreme Court 
Filed"-Clk's Record due to ISC 4/26/11 Due to 
Atty's w/Transcripts 3/22/11-Reporter Notified 
SCDF KELSO Supreme Court Document Filed- Misc-"Clerk's Idaho Supreme Court 
Certificate Filed"Appeal filed 
003 
ORIGINAL 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power Bouse Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
f IRS T J U DIC i 1\ L DI S T. 
1 20IO JAN I '-l A 11 : I! 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CJ)2Q(Q • 0047 ' 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND 
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 
OF AGENCY DECISION 
Category: L(3) 
Fee: $88.00 
COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petition for Judicial 
Review, and alleges, as follows, 
1. The Petitioner RAYMOND SCOTT PECK is a resident of 
Bonner County, Idaho. 
2. This is an appeal and petition for judicial review from 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the Bu 
day of January, 2010 (a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto) by the STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION. This appeal and petition for judicial review are 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-8002A and§§ 67-5270 through 67-5279. 
NED iO S1E\JE \JERB"1 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTEASS\G \STR\Cl JUDGE 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION O ij 4 0 11 
3. The Petitioner is aggrieved by the final agency action 
of the Idaho Transportation Department, specifically the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8 th day of 
January, 2010. 
4. Venue is proper in the District Court in Bonner County, 
Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5272(c). 
5. This filing is timely as required by Idaho Code § 67-
5273. 
6. The Petitioner contends that the actions by the 
Respondent were not supported by law or fact and/or the record 
before the agency. 
7. The Petitioner was arrested and cited for allegedly 
speeding and driving under the influence in violation of Idaho 
Code on or about December 2, 2009. Also, the arresting Officer 
issued on December 2, 2009 and served a Notice of Suspension upon 
the Defendant on or about December 3, 2009, purporting to suspend 
the driving privileges of the Petitioner for a period of 90 days 
set to commence 30 days from December 3, 2009. 
8. The Petitioner timely requested a hearing on the Notice 
of Suspension with the Respondent. 
9. A telephonic hearing was held on December 29, 2009 with 
Idaho Transportation Department Hearing Examiner Eric Moody 
presiding. Both the Petitioner and John A. Finney, Attorney, 
participated in said hearings, reserving objections to the hearing 
and process. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 2 005 
10. The Respondent's Hearing Examiner failed to consider 
all the arguments made by the Petitioner and/or errored in his 
findings of fact and/or conclusions of law. 
11. The decision of the Respondent's Hearing Examiner 
should be reversed and the license suspension denied and vacated. 
12. Idaho Code§ 67-5274 authorizes this Court to Stay the 
decision upon appropriate terms. The Petitioner requests the 
Court to enter an Order Staying the imposition of a suspension of 
the Petitioner's driving privileges pending the outcome of this 
petition for judicial review. 
13. The Petitioner is presently employed by Peck Dirt Works 
and requires a CDL driver's license to work. 
14. If the Court does not stay the suspension of the 
Petitioner's driving privileges the Petitioner will suffer 
irreparable injury as a result of the Respondent's failure to 
follow the requirements of Idaho Code§ 18-8002A and/or errors of 
fact and in law. 
15. The Petitioner accepts any reasonable conditions upon 
the stay that the court imposes. 
16. The Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
against the Respondent pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 as it acted 
without any basis in law or fact. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioners pray for the Court to: 
A. Reverse the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and 
Order by denying and/or vacating the suspension of the 
Petitioner's driving privileges. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE 006 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 3 
B. Stay the Petitioner's license suspension pending the 
outcome of this Petition subject to any reasonable conditions 
imposed by the Court; 
C. Award the Petitioner attorney fees and costs against 
the Respondent. c.{r:--
DATED this J.:r day of January, 2010. 
~~·~ 2-_ BN A. FINNEY 
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.AP" 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this [l{~y of January, 2010 a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, was served by deposit in 
First Class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and was addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General - Two copies 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Administrative Bearing Section 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 4 007 
IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATrER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------ ) 
IDAHO D.L. No.QK306825A 
ALEN0.486A00041745 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
This matter came on for Administrative License Suspension (ALS) 
hearing on December 29, 2009, by telephone conference. John Finney, 
Attorney at Law, represented Peck. 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served 
pursuant to Idaho Code §18-8002A* is SUSTAINED. 
EXHIBIT LISTt 
The hearing examiner received the following exhibits into evidence 
as part of the record of the proceeding: 
1. Notice of suspension 
2. Evidentiary test results 
3. Evidentiary test results 
4. Sworn statement 
5. Order 
6. Copy of petitioner's driver's license 
7. Envelope from law enforcement agency 
8. Certificate of receipt of law enforcement documents 
RECEIVED JAN 1 1 2010 
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9. Petitioner's hearing request 
10. Petitioner's driving record 
THE HEARING EXAMINER HAS TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS: 
1. Records regularly maintained by ITD* 
2. IDAPA§ Rules and manuals 
3. ISP** standards and procedures tt for breath testing instruments 
4. Idaho Statutes, city, and county ordinances and procedures 
5. Reported Court Decisions 
6. NHTSA** driving while impaired and SFSTs§§ testing manuals 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS *** 
Mr. Peck testified: 
1. Drove east on Highway 200 and then turned south onto US 95. 
2. Highway 200 in this area lacks buildings or structures prior to US 95. 
3. Driving 45 mph prior to the traffic stop. 
4. Did not complete or was asked to perform any SFSTs. 
5. The breath test eventually produced an invalid second breath test. 
6. After restarting the observation period, opened his mouth, tapped on 
his chest, and then belched prior to the first breath sample. 
7. The observation period was not restarted after he belched. 
8. ITD's letter dated December 18, 2009, notes a rescheduled ALS 
hearing on December 09, 2009, at 11 :00 am. 
Mr. Finney's comments and arguments: 
1. Peck was not properly notified of his ALS hearing. 
2. Idaho Code requires the driver be given notice of certain matters 
noted in Idaho Code §18-8004, Idaho Code §18-8004(c), and Idaho 
Code §18-8006. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSION~! I{}\-WAND ORDER - 2 
3. The notice of suspension form refers to these Idaho Code sections but 
does not give the consequences noted in these statutes. 
4. The requirement of notifying a driver pursuant to Idaho Code §18-
8002 and Idaho Code §18-8002A has not been met. 
5. Statute and the notice of suspension fail to give notice or 
consequences associated with Idaho Code §49-335(2). 
6. Peck has a commercial driver's license (CDL). 
7. The lack of the CDL consequences on the notice of suspension form 
violates Peck's due process rights. 
8. Exhibit 4's narrative provides no SFSTs were administered. 
9. Exhibit 4's check box shows Peck had failed the SFSTs. 
10. Exhibit 4's check box is contrary to Exhibit 4's narrative and Peck's 
testimony. 
11.No reasonable grounds exist to request evidentiary testing. 
12. Exhibit 4 does not identify evidentiary testing instrument SPD68-
013383 or if it was an approved ISP testing instrument. 
13.Exhibit 2 notes .a simulator check number 0008 as .085. 
14. Exhibit 3 notes a simulator check number 0009 as .080. 
15. There is a difference of .005 in simulator checks. 
16.This difference shows doubts in Peck's actual test results. 
17.There is no evidence this incident occurred within the State of Idaho. 
18. Bennett vs. ITD (147 Idaho 141) notes the manual and procedural 
procedures were violated. 
19.Officer Crossley did not state that Peck did or did not belch. 
20. Peck's testimony has not been contradicted. 
21.Officer Crossley noted Peck violated Idaho Code §49-654(2). 
22.Testimony has not been contradicted in noting where Peck was driving. 
23. Where Peck was driving, Idaho Code §49-654(2)(d) applies and allows 
speeds up to 65 mph. 
24.Idaho Code §49-654(2)(e) permits 55 mph in other locations. 
011 
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DISCUSSION 
The record does show a notice dated December 18, 2009, 
provides Peck's rescheduled ALS hearing was to be held on December 09, 
2009. This clerical error is a minor error and a due process or Idaho Code 
violation did not occur since both Peck and his attorney, Mr. Finney, were 
able to attend, provide testimony and argument at this rescheduled ALS 
hearing held on December 29, 2009. 
ISSUES RAISED AT HEARING IN ADDITION TO ISSUES SET FORTH IN 
IDAHO CODE §18-8002A ttt 
1. Was Peck improperly informed of his CDL disqualification? 
2. Response to additional issues raised at this ALS proceeding. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I, having heard the testimony; having heard the issues raised by 
the driver; having considered the exhibits admitted as evidence; having 
considered the matter herein; and being advised in the premises and the 
law, make the following Findings of Fact: 
PURSUANT To IDAHO CODE §18-8002A(7) THE PETITIONER HAS 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
REGARDING ALL IDAHO CODE §18-8002A STANDARDS AND ALL 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER. 
1. 
DID OFFICER NOLAN CROSSLEY HAVE LEGAL CAUSE To STOP THE 
VEHICLE PECK WAS DRIVING? 
1. Officer Crossley observed the vehicle driven by Peck travel 45 mph in 
a posted 35 mph speed zone. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 4 
2. Since Exhibit 4 specifically states a "posted speed limit" of 35 mph, it 
is assumed this area of highway met the requirements of Idaho Code 
§49-654(2)(a) and/or(b) even though there are no structures or 
buildings in the area prior to Peck being stopped. 
3. Further in supporting that the posted speed limit was 35 mph, Exhibit 
4 provides Officer Crossley had issued Peck a speeding citation. 
4. Peck's argument regarding the posted speed limit is unsupportive and 
fails to meet his burden of proof. 
5. Officer Crossley had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Peck. 
2. 
DID OFFICER CROSSLEY HAVE LEGAL CAUSE TO BELIEVE PECK 
VIOLATED IDAHO CODE §18-8004? 
1. Officer Crossley observed Peck driving a motor vehicle. 
2. Peck exhibited the following behaviors: 
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage 
b. Slurred speech 
c. Impaired memory 
d. Glassy eyes 
e. Bloodshot eyes 
4. Exhibit 4 notes Peck refused the SFSTs after being asked to submit to 
the three field tests. 
5. Exhibit 4 shows that Peck1s testimony about not being asked to 
perform the SFSTs is not an accurate statement. 
6. Even if Exhibit 4 contains contrary statements as to whether Peck had 
performed or refused all three SFSTs, in accordance to Idaho Court 
rulings, Officer Crossley 1s minimal observations of Peck as noted in 
Exhibit 4 1s DUI NOTES and narrative section is sufficient for Officer 
Crossley to have legal cause to arrest Peck and request an evidentiary 
test. 
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3. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE A VIOLATION OF 
IDAHO CODE §§18-8004, 18-8004C, OR 18-8006? 
1. The analyses of Peck's breath samples indicated a BrAC*'" of .083/.086. 
2. Peck was in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
4. 
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORMED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE AND ISP FORENSIC 
SERVICES SOPS? 
1. Officer Crossley's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in 
compliance with Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
2. I find it very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck 
tapping his chest, opening his mouth, and then belching prior 
submitting to a breath sample at 00:48 on December 03, 2009. 
3. Exhibit 3's BrAC results support this conclusion in that Peck's two 
subject tests only differed by .003 making the results valid subject 
tests pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Sections 3.2 and 3.2.3 
requirements. 
4. Further, this agreement noted in Exhibit 3's BrAC two tests further 
strongly refute the possibility that any mouth alcohol from Peck's 
"alleged" belching had skewed Exhibit 3 results before Peck was 
administered an evidentiary breath test. 
5. Peck's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code 
and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
s. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT FUNCTION PROPERLY 
WHEN THE TEST WAS ADMINISTERED? 
1. The evidentiary testing instrument used to test Peck's breath sample 
completed a valid simulator solution check at 00:48 hours on 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 6 
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December 03, 2009. 
2. The valid simulator solution check approved the instrument for 
evidentiary testing in accordance with ISP Forensic Services SOP. 
a. The certificate of analysis for simulator solution number 08804 
provides for a range of 0.072 to 0.088 with a target value of 
0.080. 
b. The range difference of 0.005 between Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 
would not have invalidated any Peck's evidentiary breath tests 
pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Section 2.2. 
3. The evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test 
was administered. 
6. 
WAS PECK ADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF HIS IDAHO 
DRIVING PRIVILEGE? 
1. Peck was read the Idaho Code §§18-8002 and 18-8002A advisory form 
prior to submitting to the evidentiary test. 
2. Idaho Code §§18-8002(3) 18-8002A(2) does not mandate a driver be 
informed of the consequences noted in Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-
8004(c) and 18-8006 prior to a driver submitting, failing to complete, 
or refusing an evidentiary test. 
3. Peck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary 
testing pursuant to Idaho Code §§18-8002 and 18-8002A. 
7. 
WAS PECK IMPROPERLY INFORMED OF HIS CDL DISQUALIFICATION? 
1. Peck's due process rights were not violated in this ALS proceeding 
based upon Peck's ALS suspension will disqualify his CDL license for 
one year. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code §49-335(1)(a), Peck being unable to retain his 
CDL driving privileges for one year based upon a sustain ALS 
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suspension is a CDL disqualification and not an ALS suspension. 
3. Therefore, before Peck submitted to ~ evidentiary testing, Peck was 
not required to be informed of the CDL disqualification pursuant to 
Idaho Code §18-8002(3) and Idaho Code §18-8002A(2). 
4. CDL disqualification arguments are issues to be raised in another 
hearing and not this ALS hearing pursuant to Idaho Code §18-
8002A(7). 
5. Peck was properly afforded all his due process rights prior to 
submitting to an evidentiary breath test. 
8. 
RESPONSE To ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED AT THIS ALS 
PROCEEDING? 
1. Idaho Code §18-8002A(5)(b) sets forth what is to be contained in a 
police officer's sworn statement that is forwarded to ITD. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code, the serial number of an evidentiary breath-
testing instrument is not required to be included within the police 
officer's sworn statement. 
3. Exhibit 4 noting "SPD Serial# 68-013383" is for another purpose and 
not this ALS proceeding. 
4. Since an approved evidentiary testing is admissible in this ALS 
proceeding, Peck bears the burden to prove that the Intoxilyzer 5000 
EN noted in Exhibit 3 was not approved as an evidentiary breath-
testing instrument. 
5. As the result of Peck failing to present evidence in showing Exhibit 3's 
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN was not approval by ISP, Peck's argument fails. 
6. The top of Exhibit 4 on the first page plainly states IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER (emphasis added). 
7. Exhibit 4 shows this incident occurred in Idaho. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW 
CONFLICTING FACTS, IF ANY, WERE CONSIDERED AND 
REJECTED IN FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING CITED FACTS. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, I 
CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES 
SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE §§18-8002 AND 18-8002A 
WERE COMPLIED WITH IN THIS CASE. 
THE FOLLOWING ORDER IS RENDERED: 
ORDER 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served 
pursuant to Idaho Code §18-8002A is SUSTAINED and 
shall run for a period of 90 DAYS commencing on January 
02, 2010, and remain in effect through April 02, 2010. 
DATED this 08th day of January 2010 
Eric G. Moody 
ADMII\IISTRATIVE HEARING EXAMINER 
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Endnotes 
· Idaho's Implied Consent Statute 
t Idaho Transportation Department's (!TD hereafter) exhibits are numeric, 
Petitioner's exhibits are alpha 
' Idaho Transportation Department 
§ Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act 
** Idaho State Police 
11 Hereafter SOPs 
0 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 
ss Standardized field sobriety tests 
*** Argument and testimony is summarized from record of hearing 
ttt Issues addressed under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) will not be repeated 
under Petitioner's issues 
*** Breath Alcohol Concentration 
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FINAL ORDER 
(Hearings pursuant to section 18-8002A, I.C.) 
This is a final order of the Department. 
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho Transportation 
Department's Administrative License Suspension Hearing Unit, PO Box 
7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129 witr1in fourteen (14) days of the issue date 
of this order. If the hearing officer fails to act upon this motion within 
twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, the motion will be deemed denied. 
Or, pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho Code, any party 
aggrieved by this final order or orders previously issued in this case may 
appeal this final order and all previously issued orders in this case to 
district court by filing a petition for judicial review in the district court of 
the county in which: 
1. A hearing was held; 
2. The final agency actions were taken; or 
3. The party seeking review of the order resides. 
An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issue date of 
this final order. The filing of an appeal to district court does not itself stay 
the effectiveness or enforcement of the order under appeal. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of January 2010, I mailed a true and 
accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
John A. Finney 
Attorney at Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864-1366 
020 
•' 
OR\ G\ NAL 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
F:INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
01d Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. C-c\2 7,,D l O - b04 l 
ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES 
The Petitioner's Ex Parte Application For Stay of Agency 
Decision coming before the Court, and for good cause appearing, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The suspension of RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's driving 
privileges set out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2, 
2009 and served on or about December 3, 2009 is stayed pending 
final resolution of this matter on the fol1owing conditions: 
2. Upon RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's compliance with the above 
conditions, and pending further order of the Court, RAYMOND SCOTT 
ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF DRIVING PRIVI~ ,f 1 
I 
PECK's Idaho Driver's License No. #QK306825A and driving 
privileges are valid. 
3. The Idaho Transportation Department is Ordered to 
return RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's drivers license to him immediately. 
4. This Order shall operate as RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's 
drivers license until receipt of his driver's license from the 
Idaho Transporta~~ Department. 
Dated this ~ day of Ja,V}IA.~, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK'S RULE 77(d) SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the 
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the 
foregoing, was served by deposit in First Class, U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, this /S day of January, 2010, and was 
addressed as follows: 
John A. Finney -/2anJJd;1~~ 
Finney Finney & Finney,#'~~ 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Administrative Hearing Section 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Idaho Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
()A)%' A~~ 
,....,,,,,-(} Clari: of our 
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n. on 
Judith Cahoon 
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3311 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8637 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
ST/\TE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOHNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL D\ST. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2010-0047 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
OF AGENCY RECORD 
Judith Cahoon, Administrative Assistant of the Idaho Transportation Department, hereby 
gives notice pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(i) of lodging of the agency record in the above-captioned 
matter. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of this notice in 
which to file with the agency any objections. If no objections to the record are filed with the 
agency within fourteen (14) days, the record shall be deemed settled. Parties may pick up a copy 
of the record between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. at the Idaho Transportation 
Department, 3311 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83703. 
The Agency Record consists of the following documents: 
Description 
Notice of Suspension - STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 1 
023 
Page Number 
1-2 
Evidentiary Test Results - STATE'S EXHIBIT 2 
Evidentiary Test Results - STATE'S EXHIBIT 3 
Sworn Statement - STATE'S EXHIBIT 4 
Order - STATE'S EXHIBIT 5 
Copy of Petitioner's Driver's License-STATE'S EXHIBIT 6 
Envelope from Law Enforcement Agency - STATE'S EXHIBIT 7 
Certification of Receipt of Law Enforcement 
Documents - STATE'S EXHIBIT 8 
Petitioner's Request for Hearing-STATE'S EXHIBIT 9 
Petitioner's Driver License Record-STATE'S EXHIBIT 10 
Notice of Telephone Hearing 
Pending Action 
Petition for Judicial Review and Ex Parte Application for Stay of 
Agency Decision 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
Correspondence 
3 
4 
5-8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13-14 
15-19 
20-25 
26-27 
28-45 
46-57 
58 
As of this DA TE, January 26, 2010, a Transcript has [ ], has not [X] been requested by 
the petitioner or his attorney. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 2010. 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
JOHN FINNEY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
120 EAST LAKE ST STE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
SUSAN SERVICK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 3 
_x_u.s. MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
__ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
_K_ELECTRONIC MAIL 
__ HAND DELIVERED 
__ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
I aho Transportation Department 
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Elise Rising 
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3311 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-4443 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
STATE OF lDAHIJ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2010-0047 
NOTICE OF FILING 
AGENCY RECORD 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now 
deemed settled and is hereby filed. 
DA TED this 12th day of February, 2010. 
sing 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
JOHN FINNEY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
120 EAST LAKE ST, STE 317 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
SUSAN SERVICK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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_JL_U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
_lL_ ELECTRONIC MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY(FAX) 
SUSANK. SERVICK 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
618 North 4th Street 
PO Box2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 667-1486 
Fax: (208) 667-1825 
ISBN 3443 
Attorney for Respondent -
Idaho Department of Transportation 
, . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CVl0-00047 
NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENT AL 
GENCY RECORD 
COMES NOW, Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorney, SUSANK. SERVICK, Special 
Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a supplemental document recently 
added to the Agency Record. This document consists of the transcript of the 
administrative proceeding. Petitioner has fourteen (14) days from the date of filing this 
transcript within which to object or otherwise request additions to the Agency Record. If 
no objection is made or addition requested, the record shall be deemed complete and 
settled as of the fourteenth day after the filing of this transcript. The Petitioner's brief 
shall then be due approximately thirty five (35) days later and Respondent's brief shall be 
due approximately twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of Petitioner's brief, or according 
to any scheduling order entered herein. 
I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the enclosed 
document is true a correct, and that, together with the original Agency Record filed in 
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this matter, the Agency Record filed with this Court is complete. The Department has 
retained the original file. 
The following is a listing of the docwnents constituting the supplement to the 
Agency Record: 
1. Transcript of the administrative proceeding held on December 29, 2009. 
Dated February '25 , 2010. . 
L~11 L~,cL 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the NOTICE OF FILING 
SUPPLEMENT AL AGENCY RECORD were transmitted, February -zs, 2010 by the 
following method, to: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
Attorney at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Fax: 208 263-8211 
Fax 
v-- US Mail 
L~Kkv,cL 
Susan K. Servick 
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JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2010-0047 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petitioner's Opening 
Brief, as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION & FACTS 
The Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner 
County, Idaho. On December 2, 2009, the Petitioner Peck turned 
left from the Wily Widgeon driveway onto Highway 200 traveling on 
Highway 200 to the intersection on US 95, and continued traveling 
southbound on US 95. The distance Peck traveled exceeded 600 feet 
in length. Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley initiated a 
traffic stop for traveling 45 miles per hour prior to the North 
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Information Center. There are no structures along the highway for 
the entire distance traveled by Peck prior to the stop being 
initiated. 
During the traffic stop, Peck did not complete any field 
sobriety tests. At the station, while in custody, following the 
first 15 minute observation period, Peck submitted to the breath 
test, with an invalid result. A second 15 minute observation 
period was commenced, during which time Peck opened his mouth and 
belched, and also patted or tapped on his chest with his fist, all 
in the presence of the officer. No additional or new 15 minute 
observation period was commenced. Less than one minute elapsed 
between the time of the belch and the breath testing conducted. 
The breach test results were .083/.086. 
The Petitioner Peck was cited by SPD Citation No. 41744 with 
a violation of "Excess of Max Speed Limit 49-654(2) 45 mph in 
posted 35 mph zone" which was Bonner County Case No. CR-2009-7986, 
which was subsequently dismissed. The Petitioner Peck was also 
cited by SPD Citation No. 41745 with a violation of "DUI 18-8004 
(.083)" which was Bonner County Case No. CV-2009-7792 which was 
subsequently resolved by a plea of guilty and a withheld judgment 
to an amended charge of inattentive driving. 
II. IMPROPER HEARING NOTICE 
As set forth in the Record, pages 20 to 25, the hearing 
conducted December 29, 2009 was not the hearing date for the 
matter. The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, 
each dated December 15, 2009, R. p. 20-21, provided for hearing 
officer Mark Richmond and a hearing date of December 29, 2009. 
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The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated 
December 18, 2009, R. p. 22-25 provided for the hearing to be 
December 9, 2009 before hearing officer Eric Moody. The hearing 
was not conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 
2009, nor in compliance with the statutory provisions of Idaho 
Code 18-8002A. Thus, the decision should be vacated. 
III. LACK OF NOTICE, VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
The Notice of Suspension form, R. p. 1-2 Exhibit 1, fails to 
satisfy the notice requirements of Idaho Code and due process, as 
it fails to give notice of the provisions of Idaho Code§ 49-
335(2) which provides that "[a]ny person who operates a commercial 
motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's license is 
disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for a period of 
not less that one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or 
submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, 
drug or other intoxicating substances concentration while 
operating a motor vehicle." 
There is no implied and no informed consent as it relates to 
the punitive "disqualification" and the testing without such 
consent violates due process. Thus the decision should be 
vacated. 
IV. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TEST RESULTS ARE LACKING 
The Affidavit and test results used to sustain the 
suspension (Exhibits 2, 3, & 4) are defective in that they fail 
to identify the alleged acts as occurring in the State of Idaho, 
indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having variations of .005, 
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and show the officer stating in the narrative matters contrary to 
the check the box portion of affidavit. Taken as a whole, the 
credibility of the affidavit and test results is lacking on its 
face. This argument is not that there are technical defects or 
lacking defects in the Department's documentation, bur rather 
credibility is lacking to support the alleged facts and/or 
suspension. Thus the decision should be vacated. 
V. NO GROUNDS FOR STOP 
The Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (Exhibit 4) and 
the traffic citation No. 41744 asserts the basis for the stop as 
traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph zone, with visual estimation 
and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho Code§ 49-
654 (2) . 
Idaho Code§ 49-654(2) contains two provisions for 35 mile 
per hour speed zones, specifically in subparagraphs (a) and (b), 
as follows: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum 
speed adopted pursuant to section 49-207(2) (a), Idaho 
Code, in any residential, business, or urban district. 
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district. 
Idaho Code§ 49-105(11) provides the definition for district 
as follows: "District" means: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and 
including a highway when within any six hundred (600) 
feet along the highway there are buildings in use for 
business or industrial purposes, including hotels, 
banks or office buildings, railroad stations and public 
buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300) 
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300) 
feet collectively on both sides of the highway. 
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(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and 
including a highway not comprising a business district 
when the property on the highway for a distance of 
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main 
improved with residences, or residences and buildings 
in use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and 
including any highway which is built up with structures 
devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For 
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance 
with the provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no 
state highway or any portion thereof lying within the 
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the 
limitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways 
within an urban district. Provided, this subsection 
shall not limit the authority of the duly elected 
officials of an incorporated city acting as a local 
authority to decrease speed limits on state highways 
passing through any district within the incorporated 
city. 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the 
Officer other than the general assertion of a posted speed limit 
of 35 mph. There is no factual statement of any specific sign or 
posting of a speed limit. There is no testimony or evidence in 
the record by the Officer or otherwise, as to the speed zone, and 
the uncontroverted testimony of the Petitioner Peck is that there 
were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the 
highway that would meet the statutory definition of business 
district, residential district, or urban district. There were no 
structures or buildings in use for business or industrial 
purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad 
stations and public buildings (Business District). There were no 
structures or buildings in the main improved with residences, or 
residences and buildings in use for business (Residential 
District). There were no structures or buildings built up with 
structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses 
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(Urban District). Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and 
US 95 in that location is controlled by Idaho Code§ 49-654(2) (d) 
providing for 65 miles per hour. 
When presented with the uncontroverted facts and argument, 
the hearing examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8th day of January, 2010 
(R. pages 49-50) that" ... it is assumed this area of highway met 
the requirements of Idaho Code §49-654(2) (a) and/or(b) even 
though there are no structures or buildings in the area prior to 
Peck being stopped." The hearing examiner cannot "assume" 
matters not in the record, contrary to the statutory basis for 
the stop, and/or controverted by specific uncontested testimony 
of the Petitioner. See Bennett v. ITD, 147 Idaho 141 (Id.App. 
2009), discussed in further detail below. Thus, the hearing 
officer's finding that the grounds existed for the stop is not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and 
the decision should be vacated. 
VI. INVALID BAC TESTS 
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police are 
charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for 
breath alcohol content and the ISP has issued operating manuals 
establishing procedures for the maintenance and operation of 
breath test equipment. Pursuant to In Re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 656, 
659, (Idaho App. 2004), noncompliance with the maintenance and 
operation procedures is a ground for vacating an administrative 
license suspension under I.e.§ 18-8002A(7) (d). As set forth in 
State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 (Idaho App. 1999) and Bennett 
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v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho 
App. 2009), the pertinent portion of the manual instructs: 
Observe the subject for 15 minutes. During this time, the 
subject may not smoke, consume alcohol, belch, vomit, use 
chewing tobacco, or have any other substance in the mouth. 
If belching or vomiting does occur or something is found in 
the mouth, wait an additional 15 minutes. 
Peck testified that he belched during the monitoring period, 
less than a minute before taking the breath test. The monitoring 
period is required in order to rule out the possibility that 
alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the 
subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation. 
Carson, 133 Idaho at 453. Only the officer's probable cause 
affidavit was submitted to the record in support of the 
suspension. The officer's form affidavit provides only 
generalized statements regarding employment of proper procedures. 
Peck presented uncontroverted specific facts of the belch. 
Peck met the burden to prove grounds to vacate the 
suspension of his license as he testified to the belch. The 
hearing officer did not find Peck's testimony to lack 
credibility. When presented with the uncontroverted specific 
facts and argument, the hearing examiner concluded in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8th 
day of January, 2010 (R. page 51) that the test was performed in 
compliance with the standards. Peck's testimony demonstrates 
that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the 
test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of I.e. § 18-8004(4). The 
officer's general, non-specific affidavit is insufficient to 
support a finding when compared to the credible evidence of Peck 
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that demonstrates a violation of proper procedures. See 
generally Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 
141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009). Thus, the hearing officer's 
finding that the breath test was conducted in compliance with 
procedural standards is directly contrary to the Bennett holding, 
and is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole and the decision should be vacated. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Peck is entitled to recover attorney fees against the State 
of Idaho, Department of Transportation, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
12-117, which governs the award of attorney fees in proceedings 
between persons and state agencies and provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or 
other taxing district and a person, the court sha11 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. 
(Emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 12-117 is not a discretionary 
statute. It provides that the court sha11 award attorney fees 
upon a finding that the state agency did not act with a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 
125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994). The policy behind I.e. § 12-117 is: 
"1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency 
action; and 2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne 
unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies 
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never should ha[ve] made." Id., (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of 
Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984)). 
Appeals from agency actions to the District Court are 
governed by I.R.C.P. 84. Attorney fee statues, such as Idaho Coda 
§ 12-117, are applicable on appeal to the District Court. The 
procedure for determining the amount of such fees is governed by 
Idaho Appellate Rules 35 and 41. I.R.C.P. 84(r). 
Here, the Department's hearing officer's decision has no 
basis in law or fact to uphold the Petitioner's suspension. The 
hearing officer cannot ignore credible, specific, and 
uncontroverted evidence or make conclusions directly contrary to 
law. The conduct invokes both purposes of the statutory policy, 
and attorney fees should be awarded to the Petitioner to 
discourage such conduct and to allow recovery for the unjustified 
financial burden placed on the Petitioner by the hearing officer's 
erroneous decision based upon assumptions and decisions not 
support by the case law or the specific credible facts. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, for any of the several grounds asserted, 
the decision of the Hearing Examiner sustaining the Notice of 
Suspension should be vacated. The relief sought is to reverse 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order by denying 
and/or vacating the suspension of the Petitioner's driving 
privileges, to reinstate the driving privileges, and for an award 
to the Petitioner of attorney fees and costs against the 
Respondent. 
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Idaho Department of Transportation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CVl0-00047 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
This is a response brief of the Idaho Transportation Department. Petitioner 
Raymond Scott Peck (Peck) requests this Court to reverse the decision of the 
Department's Hearing Officer, who determined that the requirements of Idaho Code 
Section 18-8002A were met and that Peck's driving privileges should be suspended for 
ninety (90) days. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 2, 2009, Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) 
by Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley in Bonner County, Idaho. Officer Crossley 
was conducting stationary speed enforcement on Highway 95 across from the North Info 
Center. Agency Record, page 6. He observed a vehicle traveling 45 mph in a 35 mph 
posted speed zone. Officer Crossley activated his overhead lights and stopped the 
vehicle. Id. He contacted the driver, who was identified as Raymond Peck, Jr. Id The 
officer detected an odor of alcohol. Id Peck refused to perform field sobriety tests. Peck 
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was arrested and transported to the Sandpoint Police Department. Peck was then given 
an evidentiary breath test and Peck's results were .089/xx/.083/.086. Id Officer 
Schneider served Peck with a Notice of Suspension and issued a permit for temporary 
driving privileges. See Agency Record, page 1-2. 
Peck requested an administrative hearing on the proposed license suspension. 
The administrative hearing was held on December 29, 2009 before Hearing Officer Eric 
Moody. See Hearing Transcript. During the hearing, Peck testified and the officer did 
not. Id. 
On January 8, 2010, the hearing officer issued his decision which sustained the 
ninety (90) day license suspension. See Agency Record, pages 39-57. In summary, the 
hearing officer found: 
Id 
(1) Officer Crossley had legal cause to approach Peck's vehicle; 
(2) Officer Crossley had legal cause to believe Peck had violated Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004; 
(3) That the evidentiary tests indicated that Peck was in violation of Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004; 
(4) That the evidentiary tests were performed in compliance with all requirements 
set forth in Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services Standard Operating 
Procedures; 
(5) That the evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test was 
administered; 
(6) That Peck was advised of the possible suspension of his Idaho Driver's 
privileges; and 
(7) That Peck was not required to be informed of the CDL disqualification at the 
time of his arrest, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002(3) and 18-
8002A(2). 
On January 14, 2010, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review. See 
Agency Record, page 50-54. On January 15, 2010, Honorable Judge Steve Verby issued 
an Order Staying the driver's license suspension pending this appeal. 
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Petitioner also writes that Peck's speeding ticket was dismissed and his DUI 
charge was resolved by a guilty plea and withheld judgment to an amended charge of 
inattentive driving. This evidence is not part of the record on this appeal and not relevant 
to this appeal. Judicial review of the hearing officer's decision is generally confined to 
the record unless the party requesting the additional evidence can demonstrate that the 
evidence falls within the statutory exceptions provided for in Idaho Code Section 67-
5276. None of the exceptions apply herein. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, LC. § 18-8002A, requires 
that the ITD suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test 
administered by a law enforcement officer. Bennett v. State, Dept. oJTransp., 147 Idaho 
141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). The period of suspension is ninety days for a 
driver's first failure of an evidentiary test and one year for any subsequent test failure 
within five years. J.C.§ 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has been notified of an ALS may 
request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the 
suspension. LC. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests 
upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. LC. § 18-8002A(7); 
Kane v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct.App.2003). 
The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds 
enumerated in LC. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-
8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-
8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered; 
or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
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LC. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a 
petition for judicial review. LC. § 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d at 133. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (LD.A.P.A.) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See LC. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. Recently, in Bennett v. 
State Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct App 2009), the 
Court of Appeals restated the necessary standard of review for the Court. The Court 
stated, in pertinent part: 
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d 
at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 
1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, 
the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 
742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) 
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the 
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
LC. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. 
Price v. Payette County Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 
583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's 
decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary." LC.§ 67-5279(3). 
Id., at 506-507. Therefore, the burden is on the Petitioner to establish that ITD erred in a 
manner specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3), and then establish that a substantial 
right has been prejudiced. 
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUES 
For the purpose of this ALS appeal, the Petitioner's Brief raises several issues: 
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1. Was the Notice of Hearing inadequate such that the suspension should be 
vacated? 
2. Was the Notice of Suspension inadequate because it failed to advise 
Petitioner of the requirements ofldaho Code Section 49-335(2)? 
3. Are the documents used to support the suspension inadequate because they 
fail to identify the alleged acts as occurring in Idaho? 
4. Did the officer have probable cause to stop Peck? 
5. Were the BAC tests done properly? 
6. Is Petitioner entitled to attorney fees? 
IV. ADEQUATE HEARING NOTICE 
Petitioner contends that his notice of the ALS hearing was not adequate and 
requires that his driver's license suspension be vacated. This argument is without merit. 
The Agency Record reveals the following: 
1. December 8, 2009 letter from attorney John Finney requesting a hearing 
on the ALS suspension. The letter was sent via fax, therefore this hearing 
officer will assume it was received by the Department on December 8, 
2009. Agency Record, page 12-13. 
2. December 15, 2009 letter from ITD with a Show Cause Letter with notice 
that the hearing date was extended due to a conflict in the hearing 
examiner's schedule. Agency Record, page 21. 
3. December 15, 2009 letter from ITD with Notice of Telephonic Hearing to 
be held on December 29, 2009 with Hearing Officer Mark Richmond at 
11 :00MT. Agency Record, page 20. 
4. December 18, 2009 letter from ITD with Notice of Telephonic Hearing to 
be held on December 9, 2009 with Hearing Officer Eric Moody at 
11 :00MT. Agency Record, page 22. 1 
1 Interesting~, this Notice must contain a typographical error since the Notice contains a hearing date of 
December 9 , that precedes the date of the letter (December 18th). This Notice probably should have read 
December 29th, not December 9th • 
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5. December 18, 2009 letter from ITD with Show Cause Letter stating the 
hearing date was extended because of a change in the hearing officer. 
Agency Record, page 24. 
6. Ultimately the hearing was held on December 29, 2009 before Hearing 
Officer Eric Moody at 11 :00 MT. Agency Record, page 32 and Transcript, 
page 1. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) provides in pertinent part: 
(7) Administrative hearing on suspension. A person wo has been served with a 
notice of suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may request an 
administrative hearing on the suspension before a hearing officer designated by 
the department. The request for hearing shaJl be in writing and must be received 
by the department within seven (7) calendar days of the date of service upon the 
person of the notice of suspension, and shall include what issue or issues shall be 
raised at the hearing. The date on which the hearing request was received shall be 
noted on the face of the request. 
If a bearing is requested, the bearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of 
the date the bearing request was received by the department unless this 
period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten 
(10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay of the suspension and 
any temporary permit shall expire thirty (30) days after service of the notice of 
suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date beyond such thirty 
(30) day period. Written notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to 
the party requesting the hearing at least seven (7) days prior to the scheduled 
hearing date. The department may conduct all hearings by telephone if each 
participant in the hearing has an opportunity to participate in the entire proceeding 
while it is taking place. [emphasis added]. 
Here, the hearing was held on December 29, 2009. This hearing date was within 
the time allowable by the statute (twenty days plus an extension by the hearing officer). 
There also was apparently no confusion on the part of the Petitioner regarding the date of 
the hearing. Therefore, no substantial right of the Petitioner was violated. 
V. THE NOTICE OF SUPSENSION PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE 
Petitioner argues that the Notice of Suspension is not adequate because it failed to 
inform him of the provisions and consequences of Idaho Code Section 49-335(2). Peck 
does not argue that he did not receive the admonitions required by Idaho Code Sections 
18-8002 and 18-8002A. Instead, he invites this Court to add language to those code 
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sections by including other consequences to the Suspension Advisory form. This Court 
should decline the invitation. 
The hearing officer concluded that the notice given to Peck complied with Idaho 
law and found: 
1. Peck was read the Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and l 8-8002A advisory 
form prior to submitting to the evidentiary test. 
2. Idaho Code Sections 18-8002(3) 18-8002A(2) does not mandate a driver 
be informed of the consequences noted in Idaho Code section 18-8004, 
18-8004(c) and 18-8006 prior to a driver submitting, failing to complete, 
or refusing an evidentiary test. 
3. Peck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary 
testing pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and l 8-8002A. 
Agency Record, page 52. The Hearing Officer's conclusion on this issue was correct. 
Idaho law sets forth the requirements for the notice provided to drivers before 
taking the evidentiary breath test. Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(2) states in pertinent 
part: 
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of 
alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, 
the person shall be informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete evidentiary testing, or if the person submits to and completes 
evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as 
follows (but need not be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing 
for alcohol or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of 
suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer will issue 
you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been 
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving 
permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete and pass an evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of 
suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or 
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be suspended; 
( c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a 
hearing before the court or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will 
be suspended. The suspension will be for one (I) year if this is your first refusal. 
The suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten 
(10) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during 
that period; 
( d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a 
hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's 
license will be suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this is 
your first failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted 
noncommercial vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The 
suspension will be for one (I) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary 
testing within five (5) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted 
license during that period; 
( e) If you become enrolled in and are a participant in good standing in a drug 
court approved by the supreme court drug court and mental health court 
coordinating committee under the provisions of chapter 56, title 19, Idaho Code, 
you shall be eligible for restricted noncommercial driving privileges for the 
purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol treatment program, 
which may be granted by the presiding judge of the drug court, provided that you 
have served a period of absolute suspension of driving privileges of at least forty-
five (45) days, that an ignition interlock device is installed on each of the motor 
vehicles owned or operated, or both, by you and that you have shown proof of 
financial responsibility; and 
(f) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of your own choosing. 
On December 3, 2009 Peck was served with a "Suspension Advisory" provides in 
pertinent part: 
3. If you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002, 
Idaho Code: 
A. Your Idaho driver's license ... will be seized if you have it in your 
possession, and if it is current you will be issued a temporary permit. .. .If you 
were driving a commercial vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not provide 
commercial driving privileges of any kind. 
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B. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becomes 
effective thirty days from the date of service on this NOTICE, suspending your 
driver's license or privileges .... You may request restricted privileges for the 
remaining 60 days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow 
you to operate a commercial motor vehicle .... 
Agency Record, page 1. 
Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single consequence 
of the failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and l 8-
8002A does not require law enforcement officers to inform drivers of every potential 
consequence of failing the evidentiary test. For example, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 
and l 8-8002A does not require an officer to inform a driver of all potential charges that 
may be filed upon the driver's failure to the evidentiary testing. Although a one year 
suspension of a CDL is another consequence of both the refusal to submit to the testing 
and the failure of the testing, it is not a potential consequence of which a driver must be 
informed at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the failure to inform Peck of the 
consequences to his CDL is not necessary and the Notice of Suspension given to Peck 
complied with Idaho law. 
VI. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TESTS RESULTS ARE ADEQUATE. 
Peck argues that the evidence submitted by the defective because the documents 
fail to allege that the acts occurred in the State of Idaho. The hearing officer rejected this 
argument finding the Exhibit 4 demonstrated that the alleged acts occurred in Idaho. 
Apparently, Petitioner's argument is that the hearing officer's conclusion that the relevant 
events occurred in Idaho was "not supported by substantial evidence in the record." 
Petitioner's argument is without merit. 
The Probably Cause Affidavit submitted by Officer Crossley contains the 
following heading: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
PECK, Raymond S. 
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* * * 
State of Idaho, 
County of Bonner 
See Agency Record, page 5. Based upon the evidence in the file, including the above 
Affidavit, the hearing officer had substantial evidence to conclude that the incident at 
issue occurred in Idaho. 
VII. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE STOP 
One of the grounds by with a hearing officer can vacate the ALS suspension is if 
the hearing officer finds that ''the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the 
person." Peck argues that the hearing officer's finding that there was legal cause for the 
stop was not supported by the evidence. Apparently, Peck's argument is that there 
insufficient proof that the speed limit was 35 mph. This argument is without merit. 
The officer testified that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. The Probable 
Cause Affidavit submitted by the officer contained the following: 
On December 02, 2009 at approximately 2300 hours, I was parked conducting 
Stationary Speed Enforcement along the southbound shoulder of Highway 95 
across from the North Info Center. I observed a single vehicle traveling 
Southbound towards me that I visually estimated to be doing 45 MPH. As this 
stretch of Highway is posted at 3SMPH ... [ emphasis added]. 
Agency Record, page 6. At the hearing, Peck admitted that he was traveling 45 mph 
when he first noticed the officer. Transcript, page 5, lines 10-12. Peck did not refute the 
evidence that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. See Transcript, page 1-12. 
On the issue of legal cause for the stop, the hearing officer made the following 
findings of fact: 
I. Officer Crossley observed the vehicle driven by Peck travel 45 mph in a 
posted 3 5 mph speed zone. 
2. Since Exhibit 4 specifically states a "posted speed limit" of 35 mph, it is 
assumed this area of highway met the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49-
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654(2)(a) and/or (b) even though there were no structures or buildings in the 
area prior to Peck being stopped. 
3. Further in supporting that the posted speed limit was 35 mph, Exhibit 4 
provides Officer Crossley had issued Peck a speeding citation. 
4. Peck's argument regarding the posted speed limit is unsupportive and fails to 
meet his burden of proof. 
5. Officer Crossley had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Peck. 
Agency Record, pages 35-36. Certainly, the findings of the hearing officer are supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Peck's argument is that there was insufficient proof that the speed limit was 35 
mph. This argument ignores the undisputed fact that there was a posted speed limit of 
35mph. The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009); Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex 
rel. Bd o/Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 
340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
Peck's argument appears to be that, even if the posted speed limit was 35 mph, 
that evidence does not prove the speed limit because Peck was not in a business district, 
residential district or an urban district. This argument also lacks merit. 
Idaho's basic rule regarding speed limits is contained at Idaho Code Section 49-
654. Section 2 of the statute provides: 
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed for 
compliance with subsection (1) of this section the limits as hereinafter authorized 
shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in 
excess of the maximum limits: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted pursuant to 
section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business or urban district; 
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district; 
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Residential, business and urban districts are defined. Idaho Code Section 49-
105(11) defines the term "district" as follows: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway when 
within any six hundred ( 600) feet along the highway there are buildings in use for 
business or industrial purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings, 
railroad stations and public buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300) 
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on both sides 
of the highway. 
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway not 
comprising a business district when the property on the highway for a distance of 
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main improved with residences, or 
residences and buildings in use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any highway which is 
built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For 
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance with the provisions of section 
49-654, Idaho Code, no state highway or any portion thereof lying within the 
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the limitations which otherwise apply 
to nonstate highways within an urban district. Provided, this subsection shall 
not limit the authority of the duly elected officials of an incorporated city 
acting as a local authority to decrease speed limits on state highways passing 
through any district within the incorporated city. [emphasis added]. 
Idaho Code § 49-207 specifically allows cities to enact and enforce general 
ordinances prescribing additional requirements for the operation of vehicles upon the 
city's highways. State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 167 P.3d 783 (Idaho App. 2006). 
Idaho Code Section 49-207(b) provides: 
(2) Whenever local authorities in their respective jurisdictions, including the duly 
elected officials of an incorporated city acting in the capacity of a local authority, 
determine on the basis of an engineering or traffic investigation, and the 
residential, urban or business character of the neighborhood abutting the highway 
in a residential, business or urban district that the speed limit permitted under this 
title is greater than is reasonable and safe under the conditions found to exist upon 
a highway or part of a highway or because of the residential, urban or business 
character of the neighborhood abutting the highway in a residential, business or 
urban district, the local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and safe 
maximum limit which: 
(a) Decreases the limit within a residential, business or urban district; or 
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(b) Decreases the limit outside an urban district. 
Evidence that Peck was not in a "district" as defined above is not relevant because 
the undisputed evidence was that there was a posted speed limit. Even if the area where 
the speed limit was posted at 35 mph did not meet the definition of a business district, 
residential district or an urban district, a city had statutory authority to place a speed limit 
of 35 mph in the area of Highway 95. Therefore, the hearing officer was correct to 
conclude that the officer had legal cause to stop Peck for speeding. 
VIII. THE BAC TESTS WERE VALID 
Petitioner argued that the BAC tests were invalid because Peck was belching 
during the observation period. Petitioner's argument is without merit. 
The Probable Cause Affidavit from Officer Crossley stated the following: 
PECK was transported to the Sandpoint Police Department, where I began the 15 
minute monitoring period and read him the ALS suspension advisory in its 
entirety, and requested a breath sample which he provided(.089/xxx) after not 
obtaining a second reading, the fifteen minutes of observation was started agin 
(sic). Following the second observation period, PECK again provided a breath 
sample (.083/.086) BrAC. 
Agency Record, page 6 ( emphasis added). Contrary to this, Peck testified during the ALS 
hearing. Peck stated as follows: 
Q: Was then an additional 15-minute waiting period started? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And during that 15-minute waiting period, at any time did you belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you have your mouth open at the time of the belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did you also pat or I'll describe it as tap on your chest with your fist 
at the time of the belch? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the officer was present when you did that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how much time from the belch until giving what would be the first 
sample of the second set of tests, how much time passed? 
A: Oh, I did it right away. 
Q: Less than one minute before taking the first breath test of the second 
sample? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: And no additional 15-minute wait period was started after your belch. Is 
that correct? 
A: No, there was not. 
Transcript, page 6-7. 
The hearing officer, after reviewing the evidence, disagreed with Peck. In his 
findings the hearing officer wrote: 
1. Officer Crossley's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed 
in compliance with Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
2. I find it very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck 
tapping his chest, opening his mouth, and then belching prior [to] 
submitting to a breath sample at 00:48 on December 3, 3009. 
3. Exhibit 3's BrAC results support this conclusion in that Peck's two 
subject tests only differed by .003 making the results a valid subject 
tests pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Sections 3.2 and 3.2.3 
requirements. 
4. Further, this agreement noted in Exhibit 3 's BrAC two tests further 
strongly refute the possibility that any mouth alcohol from Peck's 
"alleged" belching had skewed Exhibit 3 results before Peck was 
administered an evidentiary breath test. 
5. Peck's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code 
and ISP Forensic Services SOPs. 
Here, the hearing officer had conflicting evidence: the officer's statement that he 
conducted two 15 minute observation periods and Peck's testimony that he belched 
during the observation period. The hearing officer weighed the conflicting evidence and 
concluded that Peck's testimony was not credible. In addition, the hearing officer found 
that the consistency of the Br AC results was further evidence that Peck's testimony 
regarding the "belch" was incredible. 
Petitioner cited Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 
(Idaho App. 2009), to support his argument that the suspension should be vacated. In 
Bennett, the petitioner challenged the ALS license suspension contending that she was 
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coughing during the 15 minute observation period, during which time, the officer twice 
left the room. The court further found that the evidence that the officer left the room was 
not specifically controverted by the officer's affidavit. The Court of Appeals held: 
Bennett bore the burden to prove grounds to vacate the suspension of her 
license. Bennett testified that the officer left the room twice during the 
f"dteen-minute monitoring period. The hearing officer did not find Bennett's 
[206 P.3d 509] testimony to lack credibility. This testimony, then, would 
demonstrate that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the 
test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with 
the requirements ofl.C. § 18-8004( 4). The State presented only the officer's 
probable cause affidavit. The officer's form affidavit provides only generalized 
statements regarding employment of proper procedures. However, when specific, 
credible evidence demonstrates a violation of proper procedures, the affidavit 
alone is insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed. 
Thus, the hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in 
compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. Therefore, the district court did not err in vacating the 
hearing officer's decision. 
Id., at pages 508-509. 
This case is factually distinguishable from the Bennett case. Here, there was no 
evidence that the officer left the room or that the officer left Peck unattended during the 
15 minute observation period. On the contrary, Peck admits that the officer was present 
in the room when Peck allegedly belched. Transcript, page 6, lines 24-25. 
Furthermore in Bennett, the only evidence regarding compliance by the officer 
with the testing procedures was a computer-generated affidavit which contained a 
paragraph above the officer's signature line that read: "The test(s) was/were performed in 
compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the standards and 
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." Here, Officer Crossley' s 
Affidavit contained specific statements about compliance with two fifteen minute 
observation periods. 
In Bennett case, the hearing officer was presented with unrefuted testimony that 
the officer left the room during the 15 minute observation period. Here, the hearing 
officer's was presented with conflicting evidence. Therefore, his role was to weigh 
conflicting evidence. Evaluating disputed evidence, the hearing officer made a factual 
determination that Peck's testimony was not credible and discounted Peck's testimony 
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regarding the alleged belch. This finding is based upon substantial and competent 
evidence and is therefore binding on the reviewing court. 2 
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST ITD ARE NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Petitioner is also requesting an award of attorney fees on this appeal. This 
argument is also without merit. Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) provides for an award of 
attorney fees only if certain conditions are met. The statute provides: 
(I) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
Therefore, to award attorney fees under this section, the Court must rule in favor 
of Peck and also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
See, Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39 
P.3d 606, 611 (2001). 
In this matter, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in law and in the 
facts upon which the hearing officer made his decision. Therefore, since neither 
requirement of the statute has been met, the court must decline to award attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, ITD respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
decision of the hearing officer, vacate the driver's license stay and uphold the suspension 
of Peck's driver's license. 
Dated June 1, 2010. 
Susan K. Servi ck 
2The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence 
in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009); Urrutia 
v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd o/Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho 
at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TBB COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2010-0047 
PETITIONER'S CLOSING BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petitioner's Closing 
Brief, as follows: 
I. There Was No Officer Schneider 
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section I. Factual And 
Procedural Background portion, the Idaho Transportation Department 
(herein "ITD") makes a statement that is not supported by the 
record. At the top of page 2 of the Respondent's Brief in the 
last sentence of the carry-over paragraph, the ITD asserts that an 
"Officer Schneider served Peck .... " The record does not support 
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that an Officer Schneider was involved whatsoever, let alone 
served anything upon Mr. Peck. 
II. The Hearing Was Not Held Pursuant To Notice 
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section IV. Adequate 
Hearing Notice portion, the ITO incorrectly presents the order of 
the Notices it issued. On December 15, 2009, the ITD first issued 
by U.S. Mail its Notice Of Telephonic Bearing (R. p. 20) setting 
December 29, 2009-as the hearing date with hearing officer Eric 
Moody, and then issued by U.S. Mail its Show Cause Letter (R. p. 
21) citing a conflict with Mark Richmond, the hearing officer's 
schedule to justify an extension. 
On December 18, 2009, the ITD first issued by fax at 2:19 
p.m. its Notice of Telephonic Bearing (R. p. 22-23) changing the 
date to December 9, 2009 and changing the hearing officer to Eric 
Moody, and then issued by fax at 3:40 p.m. its Show Cause Letter 
(R. p. 24-25) citing a change of hearing officer. 
The ITD attempts to shrug off its hearing notice for December 
9, 2009 as an interesting typographical error that "probably 
should have read December 29th ." The December 18, 2009 Notices 
changed both the hearing officer and the hearing date. There was 
not a shown cause letter or assertion to exceed the 20 day hearing 
deadline in Idaho Code 18-8002A(7) once the hearing officer was 
changed to Eric Moody. The basis for the December 29 hearing date 
was that the hearing officer Mark Richmond had a scheduling 
conflict. There is nothing in the record to support not holding 
the hearing as noticed for December 9 nor to exceed the 20 day 
period to an unnoticed date of December 29. The hearing was not 
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noticed nor held in compliance with the statutory provisions of 
Idaho Code 18-8002A. 
The ITO concludes with the assertion that "no substantial 
right of the Petitioner was violated," but the standard on review 
is whether the ITO complied with the statutory requirements. 
Thus, for each of those reasons, the hearing officer's decision 
should be vacated. 
III. Implied Consent Requires Notice Of The Consequences 
The Idaho statutes for alcohol testing in Idaho Code§§ 18-
8002 and 18-8002A are based upon implied consent. The statutory 
fiction of imp1ied consent is conditioned upon notice of the 
consequences being given to the driver immediately prior to the 
testing. Without proper notice, the driver has not given implied 
consent and the 1icense cannot be suspended. 
As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 
P. 2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995) , "Idaho 1aw requires strict 
adherence to the statutory language ... " which provides notice. 
Further, a driver's license is to be reinstated if the driver is 
"not completely advised of his rights and duties." Matter of 
Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995) 
citing Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 
(1987) . 
Also, as set forth in Ha1en v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-
834, 41 P.3d 257, 261 - 262 (Idaho 2002) the warrantless search 
exception is based upon the implied consent. Implied consent 
requires notice of one's rights and the consequences. As no 
notice is given of the disqualification provisions of Idaho Code 
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§ 49-335(2), there is no implied and no informed consent. Thus 
the without being informed of the statutory provision, the testing 
is not upon consent, and violates due process. Thus the hearing 
officer's decision should be vacated on those grounds. 
IV. The Affidavit Is Lacking 
The Affidavit set forth at Exhibit 4 (R. Pgs. 4-8)) fails to 
identify the alleged acts as occurring in the State of Idaho. 
The ITD does not dispute that. The ITD asserts that the 
Affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to show jurisdiction since 
the heading indicates that it may relate to some filing in a 
judicial case in the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, and that 
it was signed by the officer in the State of Idaho, County of 
Bonner. The caption for another proceeding and the location it 
was signed in, do not make up for the factual deficiency that no 
state or county are provided for in the recitations of the 
alleged events. If the officer signed in Kootenai County, Idaho 
that in and of itself would not be sufficient to assert the 
conduct did not occur in Bonner County, Idaho if sufficient facts 
were set forth in the Affidavit of acts in Bonner County, Idaho. 
In this instance the Affidavit is defective, and the defect 
is not cured based upon the caption and the location signed. 
This is the same affidavit that indicates in the narrative that 
certain tests were not administered, but in the check the box 
portion asserts the tests were given and failed. The Affidavit 
lacks credibility to support the alleged facts and/or suspension. 
Thus the hearing officer's decision should be vacated on these 
grounds. 
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VI. Probable Cause Is Lacking 
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section VII. Probable Cause 
For The Stop, the ITC asserts in essence that a posted speed limit 
sign, without any statutory authority for its posting, controls 
over the statutorily mandated speed limit. It cannot be presumed 
or even assumed that a posted speed limit sign controls what 
statutory District exists. If this were the case, the statute 
would provide for all speed limits to be set by posting, not by 
District definition. The posting must comply with the District, 
as defined by statute. 
The Petitioner Peck's argument can be summarized as follows: 
The statutorily defined District sets the applicable speed limit. 
A speed limit sign posted contrary to the statute is of no effect. 
The posting is void and ultra vires. In other words, the sign 
does not control the speed limit; rather the statutory definition 
defines the limit. A sign posted contrary to the law, is of no 
effect. 
The ITC also attempts to argue that a city can lower the 45 
mile per hour speed within the Urban District pursuant to Idaho 
Code 49-l0S(ll(c). In order for this provision to be applicable, 
Peck would have had to have been in an Urban District (and proof 
of city acting would be necessary). As irrefutably established by 
the evidence, the portion of the highway upon which Peck was 
traveling, was NOT in an Urban District. Therefore, it is 
irrelevant if an incorporated city acted or not, because an 
incorporated city only has authority to act in the Urban District, 
not outside of an Urban District. 
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The ITD and its hearing officer cannot "assume" matters not 
in the record and contrary to the statutory scheme establishing 
speed limits. Thus, the hearing officer's finding that the 
grounds existed for the stop is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole and the decision should be 
vacated. 
VII. The BAC Tests Are Invalid 
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section VIII. The BAC Tests 
Were Valid, the ITO attempts to distinguish the Bennett case and 
holding. In Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 
141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the officer's affidavit asserted 
compliance with the testing procedures (which included that he 
was present to observe during the observation period). In this 
circumstance the officer's affidavit likewise asserts compliance 
with the testing procedures (which include that he did not 
observe any belch). In Bennett, the specific testimony was that 
the officer did observe during the entire observation period. In 
this circumstance, the specific testimony is that the officer did 
observe a belch during the observation period. The facts and the 
holding of Bennett fall squarely in line with the pending issue. 
The hearing officer did not have any credible specific evidence 
from the officer's affidavit that Peck did not belch. The 
hearing officer did not find Peck to not be credible. 
Peck's testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring 
procedures were not followed, and that the test for alcohol 
concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). There was no specific 
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conflicting evidence presented by the hearing officer. Thus, the 
hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in 
compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to the 
Bennett holding, and is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. The decision should be vacated on these 
grounds. 
VIII. Conclusion - The Suspension Should Be Vacated 
As set forth in the Petitioner's Opening Brief and as set 
forth above, the hearing officer's decision sustaining the Notice 
of Suspension was in error. The Notice of Suspension should be 
vacated with the Petitioner's driving privileges reinstated, and 
for an award to the Petitioner of attorney fees and costs against 
the Respondent. 
DATED this of June, 2010. 
~-T . 
~BN A. FINNEY-~ ;INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the ~ 
foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this V' 
day of June, 2010, and was addressed to: 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
618 North 4 th Street 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-0000047 
DECISION ON APPEAL 
Raymond Scott Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the 
administrative suspension of his driver's license. No substantial rights of Mr. 
Peck were prejudiced. Substantial evidence in the record supports the hearing 
officer's findings. The agency's decision is affirmed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case stems from Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation's 
(hereafter, "Department") suspension of Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck's driving privileges. On 
January 14, 2010, Mr. Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Department's 
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administrative suspension of his license. The parties filed appellate briefs, and the matter came 
before the Court for oral argument on September 8, 2010. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Statement of Facts 
On December 2, 2009, Mr. Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) by 
Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley in Bonner County, Idaho. Officer Crossley was 
conducting stationary speed enforcement on Highway 95 across from the North Information 
Center. He observed a vehicle traveling 45 mph in a 35 mph posted speed zone. He contacted 
the driver, who was identified as Raymond Peck. The officer detected an odor of alcohol. Mr. 
Peck refused to perform field sobriety tests. He was arrested and transported to the Sandpoint 
Police Department. Mr. Peck was then given an evidentiary breath ( or blood alcohol content 
(BAC)) test and his results were .089/xx and .083/.086. Officer Crossley served Peck with a 
Notice of Suspension and issued a permit for temporary driving privileges. 
Peck requested an administrative hearing on the proposed license suspension. The 
hearing was held on December 29, 2009, before Hearing Officer Eric G. Moody. On January 8, 
2010, the hearing officer issued "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order," in which 
he sustained the suspension of Mr. Peck's license. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Statutory Standard of Review of Administrative Agency Decision 
In Idaho Code § 67-5279, the legislature outlined the role of the Court in reviewing an 
agency decision as follows: 
(l) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the 
appeUant have been prejudiced. 
LC.§ 67-5279(1), (3)-(4). (Emphasis supplied). 
B. Appellate Standard of Review of Administrative License Suspension 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of 
Marvin Gibbar, State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v. Marvin Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 
155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006), states: 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a 
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person's driver's license. See LC.§§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an 
appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under 
IDAPA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's 
decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep 't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 
669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1 ); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. 
Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is 
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine 
County, ex rel. Bd Of Comm 's, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) 
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging 
the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner 
specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has 
been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd Of County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 
426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3). 
Id at 941-942, 15 5 P .3d at I I 80-118 I. (Emphasis supplied). 
IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS 
A. Raymond Peck's Arguments 
On appeal, Mr. Peck presents the following arguments: 
1. Improper Hearing Notice 
The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated December 15, 
2009, provided for Hearing Officer Mark Richmond and a hearing date of December 29, 2009. 
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(R. at 20-21) The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated December 
18, 2009, provided for the hearing to be December 9, 2009, before Hearing Officer Eric Moody. 
(R. at 22-25). The hearing was not conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009, 
nor in compliance with the statutory provisions of Idaho Code § 18-8002A. 
2. Lack of Notice, Violation of Due Process 
The Notice of Suspension Form (R. at 1-2, Exhibit 1) fails to satisfy the notice 
requirements of the Idaho Code and due process, as it fails to give notice of the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 49-335(2), which provides that: 
Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B 
or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for 
a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or submits 
to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating 
substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle. 
There is no implied and no informed consent as it relates to the punitive 
"disqualification" and the testing without consent violates due process. 
3. The Affidavit and Test Results are Lacking 
The Probable Cause Affidavit and test results used to sustain the suspension (R. at 
3-8, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4) are defective in that they: (1) fail to identify the alleged acts as 
occurring in the State of Idaho; (2) indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having 
variations of .005; (3) and show the officer stating matters in the narrative, contrary to the 
"check the box" portion of the affidavit. Taken as a whole, the credibility of the affidavit 
is in question because the statements made in the affidavit are contradictory. 
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4. No Grounds for Stop 
The Probable Cause Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (R. at 5-8, Exhibit 4) 
and the traffic citation assert the basis for the stop as traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph 
zone, with visual estimation and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho Code § 
49-654(2). 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the officer other than the 
general assertion of a posted speed limit of 35 mph. There is no factual statement of any 
specific sign or posting of a speed limit. There is no testimony or evidence in the record 
by the officer, or otherwise, as to the speed zone, and the uncontroverted testimony of the 
Mr. Peck is that there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway 
that would meet the statutory definition of business district, residential district, or urban 
district. Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and US 95 in that location is 
controlled by Idaho Code § 49-654(2)(d), which provides for 65 mph. 
Thus, the hearing officer's finding that grounds existed for the stop 1s not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
5. Invalid BAC Tests 
Mr. Peck testified that he belched during the 15-minute monitoring period, less 
than a minute before taking the breath test. The monitoring period is required in order to 
rule out the possibility that alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the 
subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation. 
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Only the officer's Probable Cause Affidavit was submitted to the Record in 
support of the suspension. The officer's "form" affidavit provides only generalized 
statements regarding employment of proper procedures. Mr. Peck presented 
uncontroverted specific facts of the belch. 
6. Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Mr. Peck is entitled to recover attorney's fees against the Department under Idaho 
Code § 12-11 7. Section 12-11 7 is not a discretionary statute. It provides that the court 
shall award attorney's fees upon a finding that the state agency did not act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
B. The Department's Arguments 
In response to Mr. Peck's contentions, the Department makes the following arguments: 
1. Adeguate Hearing Notice 
The Agency Record reveals the following: 
(i) December 8, 2009, letter from attorney John Finney requesting a hearing on the ALS 
suspension. The letter was sent via fax, and therefore, the hearing officer assumes it 
was received by the Department on December 8, 2009. (R. at 12-13). 
(ii) December 15, 2009, letter from the Department with a Notice of Telephonic Hearing 
to be held on December 29, 2009, with Hearing Officer Mark Richmond. (R. at 20). 
(iii) December 15, 2009, letter from the Department with a Show Cause Letter with notice 
that the hearing date was extended due to a conflict in the hearing examiner's 
schedule. (R. at 21 ). 
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(iv) December 18, 2009, letter from the Department with a Notice of Telephonic Hearing 
to be held on December 9, 2009, with Hearing Officer Eric Moody. (R. at 22). 
The December 18, 2009, letter from the Department must contain a typographical error, since the 
Notice contains a hearing date of December 9th that precedes the date of the letter (December 
18th). This Notice probably should have read December 29th, not December 9th. 
The hearing was held on December 29th before Hearing Officer Eric Moody. The 
December 29th hearing date was within the time allowable by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), that is, 
twenty (20) days from the date the hearing request was received by the Department, plus the 
extension by the hearing officer. There was also no confusion on the part of Mr. Peck regarding 
the date of the hearing. Therefore, no substantial right of Mr. Peck was violated. 
2. The Notice of Suspension Provides Adequate Notice 
Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single consequence of the 
failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A do not require 
that law enforcement officers inform drivers of every potential consequence of failing the 
evidentiary test. Although a one-year suspension of a commercial driver's license is another 
consequence of both the refusal to submit to the testing and the failure of the test, it is not a 
potential consequence of which a driver must be informed at the time of his arrest. 
3. The Affidavit and Test Results are Adequate 
Based upon the evidence in the file, including the heading of the Probable Cause 
Affidavit (R. at 5), showing that that the case is being brought in district court in the "State of 
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Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner," the hearing officer had substantial evidence to conclude 
that the driving occurred in Idaho. 
4. Probable Cause for the Stop 
The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by the officer stated that "this stretch of 
Highway is posted at 35 mph ... " (R. at 6). At the hearing, Mr. Peck admitted that he was 
traveling 45 mph when he first noticed the officer. (Transcript at 5, lines 10-12). Peck did not 
refute the evidence that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. (Transcript at 1-2). 
5. The BAC Tests Were Valid 
The hearing officer had conflicting evidence: the officer's statement in the Probable 
Cause Affidavit that he conducted two 15-minute observation periods, and Mr. Peck's testimony 
that he belched during the observation period. The hearing officer weighed the conflicting 
evidence and concluded that Mr. Peck's testimony was not credible. In addition, the hearing 
officer found that the consistency of the BAC results was further evidence that Mr. Peck's 
testimony regarding the belch was not credible. 
6. Attorney's Fees Against the Department are Not Justified 
To award attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117, the Court must rule in favor of Mr. 
Peck and also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
In this case, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis, both in law and in fact, 
upon which the hearing officer made his decision. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Substantial Rights Of Mr. Peck Were Not Prejudiced 
Mr. Peck argues that the agency decision should be set aside because the hearing was not 
conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009, which was set forth in the 
December 18, 2009, Notice of Telephonic Hearing. The Department claims that the December 
18, 2009, Notice contained a typographical error; it should have read December 29, 2009, which 
was the hearing date set forth in the Department's earlier Notice. According to the Department, 
there was no confusion on the part of Mr. Peck regarding the date of the hearing. 
Mr. Peck also asserts that the agency decision should be set aside because the arresting 
officer failed to give Mr. Peck notice of the provisions of I.C. § 49-335(2). Specifically, Mr. 
Peck contends that he should have been informed that he could be disqualified from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle for one year for refusing to submit to, or by failing a BAC test. The 
Department states that the one-year suspension of a commercial driver's license is just another 
consequence of the refusal to submit to, or the failure of the test, but it is not a potential 
consequence which a driver must be informed of at the time of his arrest. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279(4), the "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." In this case, the hearing was held on December 
29, 2009. Mr. Peck was represented at the hearing by his attorney, John Finney. Simply stated, 
the listing of an already passed date as being the date of the hearing did not affect any 
"substantial right" of Mr. Peck, as he did attend the hearing and the issues he raised were 
addressed. 
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In regard to the fact that Mr. Peck was not informed of the consequence of either not 
taking the test or failing the test, the result of either choice in this case would have been the 
same, that is, a one-year suspension of Mr. Peck's license. 
As can be seen by the facts presented, no substantial right of Mr. Peck was prejudiced 
either by the typographical error in the December 18, 2009, Notice of Hearing or by the officer's 
failure to inform Mr. Peck of the potential one-year commercial driver's license suspension. 
B. Mr. Peck Failed To Satisfy His Burden Of Proof Under I.C. § 49-654(2) 
Idaho Code § 49-654 provides, in pertinent part: 
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed for 
compliance with subsection (1) of this section the limits as hereinafter authorized 
shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in 
excess of the maximum limits: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted pursuant to 
section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business or urban district; 
(d) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on state highways; ... 
LC. § 49-654(2)(a), (d). (Emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Peck maintains that the agency decision should be set aside because there 
were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway that would meet the 
statutory definition of a business district, residential district, or urban district set forth in 
LC. § 49-654(2)(a), and therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and US 95 in the 
location where the alleged act occurred is 65 mph, pursuant to LC. § 49-654(2)( d). 
In order to prevail, however, Mr. Peck must show that "no special hazard or 
condition exists that requires lower speed." No testimony was presented to negate this 
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preconditions to the applicability of LC. § 49-654(2). Without establishing the 
preconditions that no special hazard and that no special condition existed, the Court is 
constrained to conclude that Mr. Peck did not meet his burden of proof at the time of the 
hearing or on appeal. 
C. The Department's Factual Determinations Are Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Mr. Peck raises several issues concerning the Probable Cause Affidavit and the BAC test 
results used to sustain the suspension, including the failure of the affidavit to identify the alleged 
act as occurring in the State of Idaho, and Mr. Peck's testimony that he belched during the 15-
minute monitoring period, less than a minute before taking the breath test. 
In the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of Marvin Gibbar, State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation v. Marvin Gib bar, the Idaho Court of Appeals states: 
[T]he agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
143 Idaho 937,941, 55 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In this case there is substantial evidence in the record to conclude that the alleged act occurred in 
Idaho. Although the affidavit is contradictory and there was conflicting evidence regarding the 
belch, the hearing officer weighed the conflicting evidence and found the officer's testimony to 
be more credible. The hearing officer's evaluation of the parties' credibility, and his conclusion 
that Mr. Peck's testimony concerning the belch should not be accepted, could have been based in 
part on the similarly of the breath test results. It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court to 
second guess the hearing officer's findings of fact under these circumstances. The agency's 
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findings must be upheld, as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
D. No Attorney's Fees Are Awarded 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.C. § 12-117(1). (Emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Peck is not the prevailing party and he did not establish that the Department acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. No attorney's fees are awarded. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation's decision to suspend the driver's license of Raymond Scott Peck is affirmed. 
DATED this Z~y of September, 2010. 
=~~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this __d!l._ day of September, 2010, to: 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
618 North 4th Street 
P .0. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
John A. Finney 
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) Case No. CV-2010-0047 
) 
Petitioner, ) PETITION FOR REHEARING AND/OR 
) MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR, 
v. ) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) and 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Respondent. ) 
) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner by and through counsel JOHN A. 
FINNEY of FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A., and pursuant to IRCP 84, 
11, 59, and/or IAR 42, petitions for the Court to rehear and/or 
moves for the Court to reconsider, and/or alter or amend, its 
findings and conclusions in the Decision On Appeal entered 
September 28, 2010. The Petitioner seeks to address the Court's 
analysis on three matters in the Decision On Appeal. 
1. Necessary Advice Was Lacking 
First, the Court did not address the Petitioner's due process 
rights as related to informed or implied consent. The Court 
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appears to decide based upon two points: That whatever the result 
of the testing, the consequence is same specific and pre-
determined outcome; and/or, that no substantial right of Mr. Peck 
is prejudiced. 
The Court failed to recognize (or at a minimum consider) that 
evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a seizure of the person 
and a search for evidence. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, Mr. Peck has a substantial right 
to be free of search or seizure. State v. Cooper, 39 P.3d 637, 
136 Idaho 697 (2001). In order to have a search and seizure, a 
driver's informed or implied consent must be based upon an 
accurate advice of the consequences. Here there is no advice 
given prior to the request for testing that a person's COL 
privileges are impacted differently than the other driving 
privileges in the advisory (one year as opposed to 90 days) As 
such there is not sufficient advice. The legal rational and 
analysis is the same as if the consequences of the "standard" 
advisory form were not read to the driver. The outcome is the 
same on the advisory form's advice whether given or not: take the 
test and fail OR refuse the test and the driver faces the same 
suspension result. The appellate decisions of Idaho have not 
concluded that since the result is the same either way, that no 
advice is necessary. The case law is exactly the opposite. The 
appellate decisions require the advice to be given to the driver 
to "validate" the implied or informed consent. 
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the 
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that the lack 
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of advice of the CDL suspension requires that Mr. Peck's driving 
privileges be reinstated. Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 895 
P.2d 182 (Idaho App. 1995); Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 
744 P.2d 92 (1987). 
2. The Basic Rule Of I.C. § 49-654 Was Not Invoked 
Second, the Court's analysis of Idaho Code§ 49-654(2) is in 
error. The Court appears to have concluded that a person charged 
with violating the maximum limits set in Idaho Code§ 49-654(2), 
must meet a "precondition" that there are no special hazards or 
conditions requiring a lower speed limit. The language relied 
upon by the Court is not a precondition, but rather statutory 
clarification that it is not a defense to the "basic rule" to be 
driving at or less than the "maximum speed limit." 
A brief history of the statutory provisions of Idaho Code§ 
49-654 shows that when codified at§ 49-701, the "basic rule" was 
just that: Paragraph (a) required that a person shall not drive 
at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. 
Paragraph (b) indicated that when a lower speed was not required 
by reasonableness and prudence, that exceeding certain speeds were 
"prima facie" evidence that the speed was not reasonable and 
prudent. See generally State v. Trimming, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P.2d 
118 (1965). Exceeding the "prima facie" speed was not contrary to 
the statute, or in other words, was not a citable offense in and 
of itself. 
The present version of the statute for the basic rule is set 
forth in Idaho Code§ 49-654(1) and still provides that a person 
is to not exceed a speed that is reasonable and prudent (a 
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subjective standard). The revision comes in that rather than 
prim.a facie unreasonable and imprudent speeds being statutorily 
set, maximum speed limits are set for certain districts and types 
of highways in Idaho Code§ 49-654(2). Exceeding the statutory 
maximum speed limit is a citable offense in and of itself. 
While the provisions in Idaho Code§ 49-654(2) set maximum 
speed limits, the provision includes the reference to the basic 
rule of Idaho Code§ 49-654(1) which may require lower speeds in 
specific circumstances to be reasonable and prudent. This is to 
address and c1arify that it is not a defense to the "basic rule" 
to be driving at or less than the "maximum speed limit." 
To summarize: A person to meet the statutory speed law must 
drive the lesser of a "reasonable and prudent" speed or the 
maximum speed as set by statute. 
Under that statutory scheme of Idaho Code§ 49-654 an officer 
when observing a driver, may cite a driver under either the basic 
rule of subsection (1) or exceeding the maximum speed limit 
subsection (2). When an officer cites a person for exceeding the 
maximum speed limit under subsection (2), that does not mean that 
a person is necessarily being charged with or actua1ly driving a 
speed that is not reasonable and prudent. 
The Court misinterpreted the introductory language of 
subsection (2) to create some burden of proof to refute an 
allegation of the citation (and in this matter the affidavit of 
the officer) that does NOT exist. The Probable Cause Affidavit In 
Support Of Arrest (R. p. 5-8) is the only evidence in the record 
of the basis for the stop. Nowhere does the officer assert that 
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the basic rule of Idaho Code§ 49-654(1) was violated or asserted 
to be violated. Nowhere does the officer make reference to any 
reasonable and prudent (or unreasonable and imprudent) based upon 
any hazards or conditions (special or otherwise). 
There is no burden of proof upon Mr. Peck to refute something 
which is not required by the statute and which was not asserted by 
the officer in the affidavit. The language focused upon by the 
Court is not a "precondition" and even if it were, it was not 
asserted as the, or even a, basis for the stop. Under any 
analysis, the officer did not assert as grounds for the stop that 
the Petitioner was traveling at a speed greater than was 
reasonable and prudent, or that any special hazard or condition 
existed. 
Also, although the issue was not reached by this Court, the 
issue of actual speeds compared to posted speeds is analyzed in 
Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542 (1998). This is an issue 
argued previously but not reached by the Court. 
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the 
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that officer 
lacked grounds for the stop, and that Mr. Peck's driving 
privileges be reinstated. 
3. The Fact Of The Belch Was Uncontroverted 
Finally, the Court failed to analyze the holding of Bennett 
v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho 
App. 2009) regarding the general non-specific affidavit compared 
to specific evidence regarding the belch. The Department's 
Hearing Officer's findings and/or conclusions regarding the Belch 
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cannot be supported (even in part) by "the similarity of the 
breath test results." That is not evidence to contradict the 
specific testimony of the belch. That is not evidence to 
discount or to find Mr. Peck's testimony lacking credibility. 
The Court is giving deference to findings and conclusions that 
were not made by the Department's Hearing Officer. 
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the 
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that officer 
lacked grounds for the stop, and that Mr. Peck's driving 
privileges be reinstated. 
Conclusion 
The Petitioner requests this Court to rehear, and/or to 
reconsider, alter or amend, the Decision On Appeal, as set forth 
above. Petitioner requests oral argument and a hearing. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above, shall come for 
hearing before the Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, on 
December 8, 2010 at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel 
may be heard, in a courtroom of the Bonner County Courthouse, 215 
South First Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864. 
DATED this lt,-~y of October, 2010. 
i~.4-~ 
' HN A. FINNE~~ 
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the ~ 
foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this lk: 
day of May, 2010, and was addressed to: 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
618 North 4~ Street 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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SUSANK. SERVICK 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
618 North 4"' Street 
PO Box2900 
Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 667-1486 
Fax: (208) 667-1825 
ISBN 3443 
Altomi=y for Respon(]~it-
ld11ho Dcpill'lmc:nl of Transportation 
) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruorCIAL DISTRlCT Of" THE STA TE 
OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOT!" PECK, CASE NO. CVI0-00047 
~ 001/003 
Petitioner, REPLY TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
vs. 
STATE Of IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Re ondent. 
On September 28, 2010, the Court issued its Decision on Appeal affinning the 
decision of the hearing officer and upholding the Petition~r·s administrative license 
suspension. On October. 12, 2010 Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider1 contending 
that the Court did not adequately address alJ the issues raised in the appeal. The Motion 
to Reconsider should be denied for the reasons stated herein. 
1. Additional Notice Regarding Plaintiffs CDL Was Not Required 
Petitioner argues that the Court did not adequately address his due process 
argument regarding the affect of the DUI on Petitioner's CDL. The argument is without 
merit. 
1 The entire title of the document is "Petitioner for Rehearing and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion 
to Alter or Amend." 
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This issue was raised by the Petitioner and addressed in ITD's Response Brief. 
See pages 6-9. This Court addressed the argument on page 11 of its Decision on Appeal. 
This Court held: 
In regard to the fact that Mr. Peck was not informed of the consequence of either 
not taking the test or failing the test, the result of either choice in this case would 
have been the same, that is, a one year suspension of Mr. Peck's license. 
Decision on Appeal, page 11. Thus, the Court properly rejected Petitioner's argument. 
2. Basic Rule of IC 49-654 Was Thoroughly Addressed. 
Petitioner argues that the officer lacks grounds to make the stop because the Court 
did not properly analyze the aflect of the statute establishing the speed limit. This 
argument also lacks merit. 
As discussed in ITD's Brief, the hearing officer found that there was a posted 
speed limit of 35 mph al the location of the stop. Respondent's Brief, page 11-13. This 
Court held that in order for Mr. Peck to prevail, he must show that .. no special hazard or 
condition exists that requires lower speed." Decision on Appeal, page 11. This Court 
reviewed this issue and correctly concluded that the Petitioner "did not meet his burden 
of proof at the time of the hearing or on appeal." Decision on Appeal, pag~ 12. 
3. Factual Findings Supponed by Substantial Evidence 
Petitioner argues that there was no evidence to contradict the fact that he belched 
prior to his breath test and there was no testimony that his testimony lacked credibility. 
This argument has also been thoroughly addressed by the Court. 
Here, the Court reviewed the findings of the hearing officer and this Court 
correctly concluded that: 
It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court lo second guess the hearing 
officer's findings of fact under these circumstances. The agency's findings must 
be upheld, as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
Decision on Appeal, pages 12-13. 
CONCLUSION 
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The arguments raised in the Motion to Reconsider have been previously raised, 
considered and rejected. For the reasons stated above, ITD respectfully requests this 
Court to deny the Motion to Reconsider. 
Dated December 14, 2010. 
CERTTFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the REPLY TO MOTTON TO 
RECONSIDER were transmitted, December 14, 2010 by the following method, to: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
Anomey at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 31 7 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Fax: 208 263-8211 
./Fax 
US Mail 
L~1<- Lv1,cL 
Susan K..Serviclc ..... . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
CASE NO: CV-2010-0000047 
ORDER ON PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Idaho Code § 49-207(3) allows local authorities to determine what the 
speed limit should be on arterial highways in municipalities. There has 
been no showing by the appellant that the placement of the speed limit 
sign in this case was in error. The hearing officer's decision is affirmed. 
On December 22, 2010, this matter came before the court pursuant to Mr. Peck's 
petition for rehearing and reconsideration. After additional thought and review, the 
following decision on the petition/motion is made. 
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I. The Weight of Evidence 
This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence presented. J.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137 
Idaho, 377, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court must defer to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). Thus, the agency's factual determinations 
are binding on this court even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel, Bd. Of Cmm 'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
II. Due Process 
There is no statutory requirement that the officer inform the defendant that his 
commercial driver's license will be suspended should a positive test occur or should he 
refuse the test. Mr. Peck did not provide authority directly on point establishing that not 
advising the person arrested of the consequences of taking or refusing an evidentiary test 
to determine the presence of alcohol is a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the 
U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The cases mentioned by Mr. Peck apply to a specific 
statute, Idaho Code § 18-8002(3), which mandates that the person who is asked to provide 
the evidentiary test be informed of the statutory provisions related to such testing in 
regard to non-commercial driving privileges. This statute requires that information 
explicitly contained in the statute be given to the person being tested. It does not require 
that the person being tested be provided with information concerning commercial driving 
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privileges. Absent the creation of such a duty by statute or the creation of such a duty by 
an appellate court, this court will not require such an obligation under the penumbra of 
"due process." 
III. The Analysis of Idaho Code§ 49-654 Was In Error 
Idaho Code § 49-654(1) is the "basic rule" provision and requires the operator to 
drive a vehicle in a "reasonable and prudent" manner, regardless of what the posted speed 
limit is. When considering the statute in its entirety, it does not require that the person 
charged with an offense establish that there were no special hazards or conditions which 
existed at the time of the stop as they may relate to the posted speed limit. The Decision 
on Appeal is in error in that respect as set forth on pages 11 and 12, and that portion of 
the decision on appeal is withdrawn. 
IV. Idaho Code § 49-207 Allows a Lesser Speed Limit 
Idaho Code § 49-654(2), Basic Rule and Maximum Speed Limits, states: 
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed 
for compliance with subsection ( 1) of this section the limits as hereinafter 
authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a 
vehicle at a speed in excess of the maximum limits: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted 
pursuant to section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business 
or urban district; 
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district; 
(c) Seventy-five (75) miles per hour on interstate highways; 
(d) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on state highways; 
(e) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in other locations unless otherwise posted 
up to a maximum of sixty-five (65) miles per hour. 
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On reconsideration of this issue, the uncontroverted testimony in the record is that 
there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway that would meet 
the statutory definition of a business district, residential district, or urban district. 
Idaho Code § 49-105D defines what a business district, residential district, and 
urban district are. 
Idaho Code § 49-105D provides, in pertinent part: 
(11) "District" means: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway 
when within any six hundred (600) feet along the highway there are 
buildings in use for business or industrial purposes, including hotels, banks 
or office buildings, railroad stations and public buildings which occupy at 
least three hundred (300) feet of frontage on one side or three hundred 
(300) feet collectively on both sides of the highway. 
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including a 
highway not comprising a business district when the property on the 
highway for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main 
improved with residences, or residences and buildings in use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any highway 
which is built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling 
houses. For purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance with the 
provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no state highway or any portion 
thereof lying within the boundaries of an urban district is subject to the 
limitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways within an urban 
district. Provided, this subsection shall not limit the authority of the duly 
elected officials of an incorporated city acting as a local authority to 
decrease speed limits on state highways passing through any district within 
the incorporated city. 
There was no showing made in the arresting officer's affidavit to rebut the 
uncontested testimony of Mr. Peck other than the general assertion that there was a posted 
speed limit of thirty-five (35) miles per hour and that Mr. Peck was going forty-five (45) 
miles per hour. With these facts in mind, the question becomes, were there enough facts 
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for the Administrative Hearing Examiner to conclude that there was a violation of Idaho 
Code§ 49-654(2), one of the offenses charged, and which formed the basis for the stop? 
To conduct this analysis, the first question which must be addressed relates to 
which party has the "burden of proof." Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-8002 A(7), Mr. Peck 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the positions he advanced 
during the hearing. 
Mr. Peck asserts that the thirty-five (35) mile per hour speed limit sign could not 
be posted because there was nothing to show that the area was either an urban, residential, 
or business district. Therefore, according to Mr. Peck, the default provisions of Idaho 
Code § 49-654 came into play and the speed limit would be sixty-five miles per hour as 
the area where he was driving was on a state highway. What Mr. Peck fails to consider, 
however, are the provisions of Idaho Code§ 49-207(3). It provides: 
(3) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by 
an engineering or traffic investigation the proper maximum speed not 
exceeding a maximum limit of sixty-jive (65) miles per hour for all 
arterial highways and shall declare a reasonable and safe maximum 
limit which may be greater or less than the limit permitted under this title 
for an urban district. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
With the officer's affidavit showing that the posted speed limit was thirty-five 
(35) miles per hour, it was incumbent on Mr. Peck, as he had the burden of proof, to 
establish that there was, in the words of Idaho Code Section § 49-207, no "engineering or 
traffic investigation" which took place in regard to establishing the speed limit on this 
"arterial" highway. This fact was not established by Mr. Peck. Therefore, the hearings 
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examiner was correct in reaching the conclusion that Officer Crossley did have legal 
cause to stop the vehicle Mr. Peck was driving. 
V. The Hearing Officer's Decision Is Based on Mr. Peck's Reduced Credibility 
In examining the tenor of the hearing officer's decision involving credibility, he 
tactfully implies that Mr. Peck's credibility is in question. A careful review of the record 
demonstrates: 
1. Mr. Peck refused to perform the field sobriety tests that were offered. 
2. Mr. Peck's testimony that he was not asked to perform field sobriety 
tests is inaccurate. 
3. The breath alcohol content (BACs) results show that Mr. Peck blew a 
.083 and a .086 on the two tests. 
4. The I.S.P. Forensic Services Standard Operating Procedure Manual 
indicates that with only a .003 difference between the two tests, the 
conclusion reached that they were valid tests is increased. 
5. The close proximity of the two results also refutes the possibility that 
any mouth alcohol resulting from an "alleged" belch was improperly 
measured. 
The hearing officer places in quotation marks, in bold, and then underlines the 
term "alleged" (in reference to the testimony as to belching) in his decision, as is done 
here. 
In Bennett v. State Department of Transportation, 14 7 Idaho 141, 206 P .3d 505 
(Ct. App 2009), the circumstances were different than those presented in this case. In 
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Bennett, there was no issue regarding Ms. Bennett's credibility. Here, there is a question 
concerning Mr. Peck's credibility from the hearing officer's perspective. In Bennett, the 
court stated: 
In Carson, 133 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227, we noted that the 
monitoring period is required in order to rule out the possibility that 
alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the subject's mouth 
from the outside or by belching or regurgitation. The level of surveillance 
must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose 
of the requirement. In light of the purposes of the requirement, 
"observation" can include not only visual observation but use of other 
senses as well. So long as the officer is continually in position to use his 
senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did not belch, burp or 
vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the 
training manual instructions. In this regard, the officer need not "stare 
fixedly" at the subject for the entire observation period. State v. Remsburg. 
126 Idaho 338, 340-41, 882 P.2d 993, 995-96 {Ct.App.1994). The fifteen-
minute monitoring period is not an onerous burden and "[t]his 
foundational standard ordinarily will be met if the officer stays in close 
physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer's senses of sight, 
smell and hearing can be employed." DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 
P.3d at 43. In State v. Utz. 125 Idaho 127, 128-29, 867 P.2d 1001, 1002-03 
{Ct.App.1993). we held that an officer who left the area in which the 
subject was being detained had not adequately observed the subject for the 
requisite time period. Therefore, to the extent the evidence demonstrates 
that the officer left the monitoring room and, as such, could not employ his 
senses to monitor Bennett, proper procedures were not followed. 
Id. at 144, 206 P.3d at 508. 
On reconsideration, Mr. Peck argues that the holding of the Bennett case is that an 
officer's "form affidavit" which provides only "generalized statements regarding 
employment of proper procedures" is insufficient if countered by the credible 
uncontroverted testimony of the person who is arrested. In Bennett, however, the officer 
left the room and there was no question concerning Ms. Bennett's credibility. 
In this case the hearing officer expressly and impliedly questions Mr. Peck's 
credibility. His credibility is unquestionably controverted when the hearing officer finds 
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that Mr. Peck's testimony concerning the field sobriety tests is not accurate. (Record, p. 
50). Mr. Peck's reduced credibility can be inferred by the use of quotation marks, the 
underlining, the use of bold type, and the term "alleged" by the hearing officer. (Record, 
p. 50). Mr. Peck's credibility is also impliedly questioned by the hearing officer's finding 
that the test result differences of only .003 similarly are evidence that the testing was 
valid. (Record p. 50). The credibility of Mr. Peck is also placed in doubt when the 
hearing officer found it "very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck 
tapping his chest, open his mouth, and then belching prior (sic) submitting to a breath 
sample at 00:48 on December 3, 2009." (Record p. 51). 
In Mr. Peck's case, it appears that the hearing officer does not find Mr. Peck to be 
credible. Therefore, the holding of Bennett is inapplicable. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this appeal and at the hearing, Raymond Peck has the burden of proof. Under 
the facts presented and the current state of the law, Mr. Peck's license suspension is 
affirmed. 
DATED this Z'o../J,t_, day of December, 2010. 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV-2010-0047 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
I.A.R. 17 
Category: L.4. 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY SUSANK. SERVICK, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant RAYMOND SCOTT PECK appeals 
against the above named Respondent STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision On 
Appeal, entered in the above entitled action on September 28, 
2010 and the Order On Petition For Rehearing, entered in the 
above entitled action on December 28, 2010, the Honorable Steve 
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Verby, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the decisions or orders described in paragraph 
1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(f), 
I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which 
the Appellant intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such 
list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, include: 
(a) Was the Petitioner fully informed of the 
consequences of testing conforming to due process? 
(b) Did grounds for the stop exist? 
(c) Were the BAC test results valid? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of 
the record? NO. If so, what portion? N/A. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES. 
The appellant requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript in BOTH hard copy 
and electronic format: The reporter's standard transcript as 
defined in Rule 25(c), I.A.R., specifically including but not 
limited to argument on September 8, 2010 and on December 22, 2010. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically 
included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All filings in the matter. 
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7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, 
or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copies and sent 
to the Supreme Court: All. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been 
served on the reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as 
named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Val Larson, 215 S. First Ave, Sandpoint, 
Idaho 83864; 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid 
the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript in 
the sum of $200.00; 
(c) That the clerk of the district court has been paid 
the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record in the sum 
of $100.00; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid in the 
amount of $101.00. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties 
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated this~ of February, 2011. 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner RAYMOND SCOTT PECK through counsel, 
JOHN A. FINNEY, and the Respondent STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTM.EN'.r OF 
TRANSPORTATION, through counsel, SUSANK. SERVZCK, and stipu1ate 
to stay the suspension of the Petitioner's driving privileges, set 
out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2, 2009 and served 
on or about December 3, 2009, and the Notice Of Reactivated 
Administrative License Suspension, dated January 10, 2011, unti1 
fina1 reso1ution of this matter upon further appea1. 
Dated this __ day of _______ , 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2010-0047 
ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES UPON 
FURTHER APPEAL 
The Stipulation To Stay Suspension Of Driving Privileges Upon 
Further Appeal coming before the Court pursuant to I.A.R. 13, and 
for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The suspension of RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's driving 
privileges set out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2, 
2009 and served on or about December 3, 2009, and the Notice Of 
Reactivated Administrative License Suspension, dated January 10, 
2011 is stayed pending final resolution of this matter upon 
further appeal. 
2. Pending further order of the Court, RAYMOND SCOTT 
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PECK's Idaho Driver's License No. #QK306825A and driving 
privileges are valid. 
3. The Idaho Transportation Department is Ordered to 
return RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's drivers license to him immediately. 
4. This Order shall operate as RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's 
drivers license until receipt of his driver's license from the 
Idaho Transportation Depar~ 
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TRANSPORTATION 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on April 12, 2011, I lodged 
the transcript from the Oral Argument proceedings held on 
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